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"My keenest interest is excited, not ly what are called great questions and great cases
but by little decisions which the common run of selectors would pass by because they did
not deal with the Constitution, or a telephone company, yet which have in them the germ
of some wider theory, and therefore of some profound interstitialchange in the very tissue

of the law."--Mr Justice Holmes, Collected Legal Essays, p. 269.

NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI
CASES
CONTRACTS-INSANITY. Doty et al. v. Mumma.' Plaintiff brought
an action to have two promissory notes, which he had signed for the accom-

modation of another, cancelled on the ground that he was insane at the time
he executed them. The fact of insanity was duly established, and, for this
reason, the court released plaintiff' from his obligation without requiring a
return of any consideration to defendant, although th'e latter, the payee of the
notes, was not aware of plaintiff's incapacity at the time that he took them, had
fully performed his side of the agreement. Plaintiff had not then been adjudged insane or committed to custody. The reason for the decision was that
the consideration, moving from defendant for the notes, had gone to a party
other than plaintiff. Upon an appeal being taken to the Missouri Supreme
Court, the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed, the court saying, "where
the insane person has not received the benefit of the consideration, the contract will be set aside without a return of the consideration, although it was
made in good faith, before an adjudication of insanity."' The decision presents one phase of the broader problem, to what extent will an insane person
be held to a contract which he has ertered into prior to his having been judicially found incapable of managing his own affairs? It is the purpose of this note
to deal with this question.
1. (1924) 264 S. W. 656.
e. 657.
2. 264 S.W. 1.
3. Walker v. Winn (1905) 142 Ala. 560, 39
So. 12; Fan Pattan v. Beats (1877) 46 Iowa 62;
Campbell v. Campbell (1913) 35 R. I. 211, 85 At.
930.
See also Dexter v. Hall (1872) 15 Woll.

(U. S.)9, 21 L. Ed. 73. In Collins u. Trotter (1883)
81 Mo. 275, there is a holding that the note of a
lunatic is a nullity, but the payee thereof apparently knew of the insanity. See also Tolson V.
Garner (1852) 15 Mo. 494.
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It is easy to say, as some courts have, that the essence of a simple contract is mutual assent; that if one party to an agreement is a lunatic there can
be no such assent, and that, therefore, a contract under these conditions cannot exist. ThS transaction, under such a theory, will be a nullity and neither
party will have any rights. If we adopt this line of reasoning, it makes no difference whether the contract be fair in its terms or otherwise; executory, or
executed. Under all conceivable circumstances, the insane person, even though
he appeared entirely rational when he made the agreement, or his duly qualified custodian, thereafter appointed, can treat the contract as void, repudiate
any obligation assumed, and recover any consideration parted with in performance of the bargain. There are decisions which go this far.'
Of course, a genuine meeting of the minds-real mutual assent-is not
essential to the existence of the ordinary contract. If a man appears to make
an offer, and his offeree accepts, there usually will be a contract, regardless of
whether or no the offeror intended to make the offer that he did make. So,
also, if an offeree appears to meet the terms of an offer and to accept the same,
his real state of mind is of no importance at all. In each instance there will
be a contract because, as Mr. Justice Holmes expresses the proposition, a
man's "obligations must be measured by his overt acts." 4 In short, the question
is, did the promisor appear to his promisee to assume a contractual obligation?
If such be the fact, the courts will not ordinarily concern themselves with the
promissor's real state of mind.,
Should the above doctrine be applied to the case where an insane contractor's mental incapacity is latent, so to speak, and unknown to his promisee
the former appearing to be rational and compos mentis? It is certainly hard
upon the innocent party, if he has changed his position relying upon the lunatic's promise, or has performed his side of the contract, to hold that he has no
contractual rights and cannot hold his insane promisor to his obligation. A
few cases, proceeding upon an objective theory and analysis of transactions,
have held that, in the absence of fraud, a contract, if it has been performed by
the innocent party, is valid, and the insane contractor must live up to its
terms, and will have no right to avoid it.6
On the other hand, a lunatic should be protected from his bargain, if
this can be done without inflicting undue hardship upon the innocent party to
the transaction. It is probably good public policy to excuse an insane person
from performance of his contract under such conditions. Accordingly, some
courts say, that an incompetent person may escape from and avoid his obligation, but only if this result can be reached on terms, which, under the circumstances of the particular case, will be substantially just to the other
innocent party to the agreement. This statement in substance can be found in
many of the American decisions. But it appears doubtful whether this principle has been adhered to strictly in dealing with all types of cases. Insane
persons have been permitted sometimes to avoid their contracts only upon
conditions that have not protected the innocent contracting party from unjust
losses, which have been brought about through the latter's bona fide performance of his side of the transaction. Usually the other contracting party has
been saved from loss, but the writer believes that, in some cases, some courts
4. Mansfield v.Hodgdon (1888) 147 Mass.304,
306,17 N. E. 544.
S. Williston,
Contracts, secs. 94, etseq.
6. Rhoades v. Fuller (1897) 139 Mo. 179, 40

S. W. 760 (but aee Missouri cases contra cited
infra note 10); Mathews v. Nash (1911) 151 Iowa
125, 136 N. W. 196 (dictum); Imperial Loan Co.
v.Stone (1892) 1 Q. B 599.
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have been too liberal with the lunatic, rescinding contracts without affording
adequate protection to the other party, upon the ground that, in the last
analysis, the lunatic is a kind of special "ward" of the court. These courts
have been willing to shield the lunatic even at the expense of the other contractor, if the inflictidn of such a loss is essential in accomplishing this desired
end. Such courts are willing to protect the innocent party if this can be done
without injury to the incompetent person, but when a case has arisen, where
the latter cannot be safeguarded without injuring the other party to the
agreement, they have preferred to place the burden of loss upon him rather
than to cause injury to the incompetent person. It is believed that there is no
real justification for courts to assume this position. Unless the result of a rescission of a contract is to place the parties in status quo ante, cancellation
ought not to be permitted. Preferably, the lunatic should be held to his original undertaking, and the contract enforced as made.
Whenever the contract has been entered into merely, and is entirely executory, there is authority that the insane person may avoid his obligation at
will, and without any condition being imposed upon him. 7 This is entirely
proper. In such a case the other party has not changed his position and due
protection of the lunatic requires a rescission. Sometimes, however, the contract is executory only in the sense that no performance has been rendered to
the lunatic, but the other contracting party has changed his position substantially in preparing to perform as agreed upon. Suppose that the insane
person has made a bilateral contract to pay for articles to be manufactured
and delivered to him; that the articles have been partially manufactured, and
that time and labor has been consumed in and about the work partially done.
Is such a contract to be regarded as executory, and is avoidance thereof to be
allowed without any compensation being given to the innocent manufacturer?
There is authority so holding, 8 but such a decision seems manifestly unjust,
and loses sight of the fact that the other party to the agreement, if he has
acted honestly, is entitled to just as much consideration as the lunatic., After
all, the incompetent person has been the moving party, and if ithad not been
for his apparent sanity the real loss would not have resulted to the other
contracting party.
If the contract has been executed in the sense that the lunatic has received all or part of the consideration bargained for, and if he has not wasted
or lost the same, the generally prevailing rule is that it can be avoided only
upon condition that the insane party return whatever hehas received." This
rule seems to be sound. It places the parties in status quo, and that is all that
the other contracting party should be entitled to. For the sake of the lunatic,
it is reasonable enough to hold, upon grounds of public policy, that the other
7. Cundall v. Haswell (1902) 23 R. 1. 508, 51
Atl. 426; Chew v. Bank (1859) 14 Md. 299. See
Baldwin v. Smith (1900) 1 Ch. 588; Imperial Loan
Co. v. Stone, supra, note 6.
8. Feigenbaum v. Howe (1900) 66 N. Y. Supp.
378.
9. "How is he (i. e. the other contracting
party) to know a person is a lunatic, and incapable of transacting business, when there are no
outward manifestations of such condition, and
the records do not show that his estate and
affairs are in the hands of a conservator?" McCormick v. Littler (1877) 85 I11. 62, 65. See also

imperial, etc. Co. v. Stone, supra, note 6; Williston,
op. cit., sec. 254.
10. Jamison v. Culligan (1899) 151 Mo. 410,
52 S. W. 224 (dictum); Mc Kenzie v. Donnell
(1899) 151 Mo. 431, 52 S. W. 214; Mc.4naw v.
Tiffin (1898) 143 Mo. 669, 45 S. W. 656; Wells v.
Covenant, etc. .4ss'n (1894) 126 Mo. 630, 29 S. W.
607; Catler v. Zollinger (1893) 117 Mo. 92, 22 S. W.
895; Blount v. Spratt (1892) 113 Mo. 48, 20S. W.
967; Brann v. Missouri, etc. Co. (1920) 226 S. W.
48 (dictum); Ronan v. Bluhm (1898) 173 Ill. 277,
50 N. E. 694. See also Hill, etc. Co. v. Loomis
(1909) 140 Mo. App. 62, 119 S. W. 967.
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contracting party should be required to lose any possible profit that he might
otherwise have derived from the bargain. That is a burden which may well
be demanded of all.
Suppose, however, that in the last assumed case the incompetent person,
after receiving the consideration from the other party, dissipates or loses the
same. Should this fact make any difference and entitle him to a rescission
without returning the equivalent in value of that received? It is believed that
it should not, yet opinions can be found advancing the proposition that, under
the assumed facts, the lunatic may unconditionally avoid the contract without
returning any value., Such courts as adopt this principle are willing, in order
to protect the lunatic, to penalize the innocent contracting party, and, if necessary, to cast the burden of loss upon the latter. These cases do not seem just.
The other contracting party should be placed in his original position."
Occasionally one meets with a case like that under review, viz., where
the defendant has performed his side of the bargain but the consideration has
not moved to the lunatic but to another party. Obviously in such a case the
incompetent person has received no benefit. On the other hand, the innocent
party has suffered a loss which as he believed the insane party, who appeared
to be sane, agreed to pay for. Again, if justice is to be done, it is difficult to see
why the lunatic should be permitted to avoid his contract without making
restitution of value, but sometimes this is allowed. 13 The problem is usually
dismissed by saying that the lunatic has received no benefit from the defendant's performance and that such relief is essential to protecthim. But why protect him at the expense of the innocent party?"4 The Supreme Court of Illinois,
in dealing with this situation, has said that where the lunatic has received the
benefit there must be restitution, because, if avoidance were otherwise allowed,
11.
Hudson v. Union, etc. Co. (1921) 148
Ark. 249, 230 S. W. 281; Bank v. Tribble (1922)
155 Ark. 264, 244 S. W. 33; Hovey v. Hobson
(1866) 53 Me. 451.
12. "....
in no case will relief be granted to
such insane person or his representatives unless
restitution is made of the benefits received by
him from the contract and unless the status quo of
both the parties can be restored. The doctrine
contended for by the plaintiffs . . . . that they
should not be required to make restitution of the
benefits received as a condition precedent to a
recovery of the land, because these benefits were
lost, or squandered by Jedediah (the insane contractor), is therefore untenable ..........
Marshall, J., in McKenzie v. Donnell, supra, note 10,
151 Mo. 1. c. 458, 52 S. W. 214 (dictum). The
court's whole argument in this phase of the case
proceeds upon the ground that the sole justification for the rescission of the contract, is the fact
that the parties can be put in their former positions. If this cannot be done it is argued that a
grave injustice will be done the defendant.
13. Jordon v. Kirkpatrick (1911) 251 11.
116, 95 N. E. 1079; Williams v. Williams (1914)
265 111.64, 166 N. E. 476; Wirebach v. Bank (1881)
97 Pa. St. 543. See also cases cited by Ragland,
J., in the case under review, 264 S. W. 1. c. 657.
14. In the principal case Ragland, J., quotes
with approval (264 S. W. 1. c. 657) the following

passage from Northwestern etc. Co. v. Blankenship
(1883) 94 Ind. 535: "Here nothing was received
by the insane woman, and it would be inequitable to hold her bound by a mortgage executed
for the sole benefit of her husband, she having
no contracting mind.
The insane are under the
protection of courts, and ought not to be bound
by contracts not beneficial to them, to which they
never assented and could not assent." (The italics
are the writer's.) It, of course, is not essential to
the existence of a contract that the minds of the
parties should actually meet. (See supra, note 5,
and text in connection therewith.) If rescission is
to be granted the incompetent person without
requiring a return of the consideration, it must be
because a proper policy demands such relief, and
because, as suggested in the quotation set out
above, insane persons are entitled to unusual
protection at the hands of the courts, even at the
expense of innocent parties, who have actually
been misled by the incompetent person's apparent
sanity. There is authority, which appears to be
contra, holding that no contract can be avoided
where the other contracting party is unaware of
the insanity without restitution, even though the
consideration has not accrued to the benefit of the
incompetent person. In Blount v. Spratt, 113 Mo.
48. 20 S. W. 967, supra, note 10, plaintiff, an insane woman, executed a deed of trust on her
property to secure her husband's debt. Plaintiff
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the lunacy would be a means of fraud. But, said that court, where the lunatic is not benefited, this is not the case.5 It is difficult to follow the learned
court on this occasion. The lunacy would seem to be an instrument of fraud
in every case, where it, not being apparent to the other party, is allowed to
cause loss to him, and loss does occur in this kind of case.
Turning to the case where the insanity is known or should have been
known to the other contracting party, avoidance obviously should be allowed. 16
It is in fact a species of fraud to contract with a person known to be non compos
mentis. The only question in such a case is, should the lunatic, when he seeks
to rescind, be compelled to restore the consideration which the other party
has given up, or its equivalent in value? In such a situation restitution might
well not be exacted as a condition to cancellation.17 The defendant should
not have contracted with an incompetent person. It is not too much to demand knowledge of this from all. A proper penalty for making such a contract
might be the loss of any value parted with.
J. L. Parks.
EVIDENCE-PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS-REHABILITATION. Jones v. St. Louis San Francisco Railway Co.' In an action
for personal injuries the plaintiff testified that he was knocked from the train
by a brakeman. The defendant introduced witnesses to prove that at a doctor's
office where the plaintiff was taken immediately after the injury, he gave an
entirely different explanation as to how he got hurt, namely, that he fell or
jumped off on a sand pile and slid under the train. The plaintiff then offered
to show by another doctor that on the day following the injury and shortly
after the plaintiff came off an operating table he was asked how he was hurt
and that he said a brakeman knocked him off the train.
The lower court held that this evidence was inadmissible and this ruling
was held to be proper by the Supreme Court of Missouri. It was stated that
the general rule is that where a witness is impeached by proof of his statements made at other times contradictory of his testimony, especially where
such is offered to show that the evidence given at the trial was a fabrication,
it is competent to prove statements made by him consistent with his testimony
for the purpose of rehabilitation. It was held,, however, that this rule has no
application unless the consistent statement offered to rehabilitate was made
prior in point of time to the contradictory statement.
The legal proposition above set forth seems first to have been considered
prayed an injunction against foreclosure and for
cancellation of the deed, but the court deried
relief because no restitution was offered. The fact
that the benefit of the consideration received for
the deed of trust did not move to plaintiff was not
mentioned by the court, but this fact was in the
record and must have been conceded by all. See
also Groff v. Stitzer (1910) 77 N. J. Eq. 260, 77
Atl. 46; Imperial, etc. Co. v. Stone, supra, note 6.
In view of the authority of the Blount case, supra
and the dictum in McKenzie v. Donnell, qucted
supra, note 12, the decision in the principal case
might have gone the other way, and, it is submitted, had it done so, a more just result would
have been reached.

15.
Williams v. Williams (1914) 265 Ill. 64,
166 N. E. 476.
16. See Ronan e. Bluhm, Jamison v. Culligan,
McKenzie v. Donnell, tupra, note 10, and Collins
v. Trotter, supra, note 3. The cases generally
assume thib proposition, and rightly so.
17. In Halley v. Troester (1880) 72 Mo. 73,
it was held that no tender to the defendant of
the consideration received by the insane contractor was essential. See also Ronan v. Bluhm,
supra, note 10. But cf. Jefferson v. Rent (1910) 149
Iowa 549, 128 N. W. 954.
1. (1923) 253 S. W. 737. See the same case on
first appeal (1921) 287 Mo. 64, 228 S. W. 780.
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in Missouri in State v. Grant.2 There appears an opinion stating the general
rule that evidence in corroboration "prior to attack or impeachment" is inadmissible and also a dictum that in case of "such attack" it is "then admissible
to prove that the witness has made statements consistent with those made
as a witness."'
The judge who wrote the opinion in State v. Grant, supra, withdrew this
broad dictum in State v. Taylor., It was there held that mere self contradiction
of a witness was not sufficient to justify corroborative evidence in the form of
consistent statements. There was a suggestion that if in addition to self contradiction the "motives" of the impeached witness had been questioned the result would have been otherwise.
In State v. Hendricks5 a dying declaration had been admitted. Then the
defendants brought forward witnesses who testified to inconsistent utterances
of the dying declarant. Then the trial court permitted the prosecution to
corroborate the dying declarant by testimony of statements by declarant consistent with the dying declaration. The last ruling was held to be erroneous.
The decision must be taken to mean that mere self contradiction is not a
sufficient justification for corroboration by consistent statements.'
State v. Sharp7 is not clear. Everett Dooley was a witness for the prosecution and testified to certain facts. On cross examination he was confronted
by a deposition he had given and he admitted that he did not testify as to
these particular facts in his deposition. Then the trial court permitted the
prosecution to show by Mrs. Margaret Dooley that Everett had stated these
alleged facts to her shortly after the occurrence and before the deposition was
taken. The theory of the trial court does not appear. The Supreme Court of
Missouri upheld the action of the trial court. The reasoning seems to be that
in case a witness is impeached through a self contradiction he may be corroborated by means of consistent statements. Among other cases State v.
Taylor, supra, was cited as an authority for this holding but it is submitted
that it holds precisely to the contrary. Nevertheless, it seems that the decision
in State v. Sharp may be supported on another basis. The argument would be
that the failure of the witness to state important facts in his deposition would
lead the jury to believe that his testimony in court was a recent contrivance.
2.
(1883) 79 Mo. 113. State v. Hatfield (1880)
72 Mo. 518, is a rape case and testimony in
rape cases for historical reasons needs separate
treatment.
3. The court recognized the latter utterance
as a dictum because it stated that the corroborative evidence "seems to have been introduced anticipatory of an attack on the character of Canfield by the state, and. therefore was clearly inadmissible."
As a matter of fact the statement of facts
(I.' c. 115) in the case seems inconsistent with the
above conclusion.
It appears that defendant
read the deposition of Martha Canfield. State
impeached her by an affidavit she had made
prior to her deposition and by other means.
"In rebuttal of this testimony the defendant
was allowed to show by several witnesses that
before her deposition was taken the witness
made statements to them consistent with the
deposition."

Wigmore (2nd. ed. sec. 1131) thinks that this
case stands for the loose and improper rule that
consistent statements may be shown after
impeachment "of any sort,"
In State v. W*helehon (1890) 102 Mo. I. c. 21,
14 S. W. 730, there is a colorless remark as to the
holding in State v. Grant.
4. (1896) 134 Mo. 109, 1. c. 154, 35 S. W. 92.
5.
(1903) 172 Mo. 654, 1. c. 675, 73 S. W. 194.
6. Fox, J., in writing this opinion stated that
if the corroborative statements were admissible,
"they are entitled to the same weight and force as
the statements themselves." But the purpose of
admitting corroborative statements after a dying
delcarant has been impeached by inconsistent
statements should be to aid the jury in determining whether the dying declaration is worthy of
belief.
7. (1904) 183 Mo. 715, 82 S. W. 134.
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If so, statements made before the deposition was given would certainly show
that there was no recent contrivance.8
The decision in State v.Maggard was placed on the same grounds as that
in State v. Sharp, supra, i. e., a witness impeached by self contradictions may
be corroborated by consistent statements. It is therefore inconsistent with
State v. Taylor, supra. The decision may be supported from another point of
view. It is stated that the defense had "fully developed" the theory that the
impeached witness was himself guilty of the theft for which defendant was on
trial. Therefore the witness may be said to have been presented to the jury
as one biased or interested. If so, it should be possible to refute the bias or
interest by showing consistent statements prior to that which caused the bias
or interest. In this case the witness might not have been laboring under a
bias or interest until he was aware that defendant was charging him with being
the thief.'o
Kelly v. Insurance Co." is an example of the proposition stated by Mr.
Wigmore:1 "A consistent statemert, at a time prior to the existence of a fact
said to indicate bias, interest, or corruption, will effectively explain away the
force of the impeaching evidence; because it is thus made to appear that the
statement in the form now uttered was independent of the discrediting influence." Evidence admitted for this purpose should be distinguished from
consistent statements admitted after a witness has been impeached by self
contradictions and nothing more. 3
This distinction does not appear to have been made in Flach v. Ball."
From all that is set out the impeachment, if any, was by self contradiction and
by that alone. The court seems tc. have assumed that the witness was impeached by a showing that he was laboring under an interest or corruption.
The trial court refused to allow the witness to be corroborated by testimony
he had given at another trial after he had made the contradictory statement,
if any. The ruling was affirmed by the St. Louis Court of Appeals because the
record before it failed to show that the witness had ever been impeached. The
court, however, added a dictum that if there had been an impeachment there
could be no corroboration by a consistent statement uttered subsequent in
point of time to the contradictory statement. This seems to be the first appearance of this qualification in Missouri. It is proper enough where the impeachment is based on bias, interest, corruption, recent contrivance or fabrication. It is unnecessary where the impeachment is based on self contradiction
and that alone.
Wills v. Sullivan"s presents interesting problems. The decision is not clear
and seems to have confused hearsay and non-hearsay use of utterances. If a
statement is used for the purpose of corroborating a witness who has been
impeached, one need not worry about the hearsay rule because a hearsay use
is not being made of the statement.
It seems that the plaintiff was impeached in two ways: (1) Swan, witness
for defendant, "testified to alleged statements of plaintiff prior to the institution of the suit"; (2) Thompson, witness for defendant, "testified that he
8. See Wigmore on Evidence (2nd. Ed.) sec.
1129.
9. (1913) 250 Mo. 335, 157 S. W. 352.
10. See Wigmore on Evidence (2nd. Ed.) sec.
1128.
11.
(1915) 192 Mo. App. 20, 178 S. W. 282.

12. Wigmore on Evidence (2nd. ed.) sec. 1128.
13.
The cases are divided on the solutionof
this question. See Wigmore, supra, sec. i126.
14. (1922) 209 Mo. App. 389, 240 S. W. 465.
IS.
(1922) 242 S. W. 180.
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had held numerous conversations with plaintiff during the time plaintiff was
at defendant's home, and that the boy had never made any complaints of ill
treatment by defendant." While the nature of Swan's testimony is not specified, yet it seems fair to assume that he tesified to a statement by plaintiff inconsistent with the latter's testimony. If so, the impeachment was by self contradiction and, so far as appears, by that alone. The trial court permitted the
plaintiff to be corroborated by consistent statements, but whether they were
made after the inconsistent statement is not clear. The Kansas City Court
of Appeals affirmed the judgment for plaintiff. This action may be inconsistent
with the dictum in Flach v. Ball, supra.16
It is to be noticed, however, that the impeachment by Thompson was not
of the same sort. He did not hear plaintiff make inconsistent statements; he
testified that plaintiff failed to make any sta'tements on the subject. The inference from his testimony would be that plaintiff's testimony was a recent
contrivance or fabrication. If that is true then it would be proper to corroborate plaintiff with consistent statements made prior to the contrivance or fabrication. It is not always possible to state accurately the date of a contrivance,
and a discretion should be left with the trial court. From that point of view
there seems to be no serious objection to the evidence that was admitted in the
instant case to corroborate plaintiff, so far as he was impeached by Thompson.
Even if this much should not have been permitted, in any event plaintiff
should have been allowed to explain why he remained silent concerning defendant's mistreatment.
State v. Creed" is another complicated case. One Edna Brooks was an
important witness for the state. She was impeached in the process of her cross
examination by admitting that she had testified differently before the coroner
and on her first appearance before the grand jury. The state then corroborated
her by showing that she had given to the police department a statement consistent with her testimony in circuit court. This was held to be error and apparently there are two reasons for this holding.
Considered on the basis of a self contradiction and nothing more the court
approved the ruling in Flach v. Ball, supra, that the corroborating statement
must have been made prior in point of time to the inconsistent statement.
There is argument in the opinion, however, that would prevent the use of even
a prior consistent statement. 18 Many courts so hold and Missouri has been on
both sides of the question."
The court also stated that the corroborative statement was made by Edna
Brooks while she had an interest and motive "to escape punishment and obtain sleep and peace." From this point of view it logically follows that a consistent statement will not show the absence of such "interest and motive"
unless it was made previous to the existence of that which caused the interest
or motive.
To sum up, there is a considerable body of law that in case of an attack
by self contradictions merely, supporting consistent statements are limited
to those made before the inconsistent statement. The reason given for this in
16. It is possible that the rulingmay be justifled because no proper objection was made to the
corroborative evidence,
17.
(1923) 252S. W. 678.
18. "Her impeachment was not disproved by
the use of the supplementary statement, and
that was allit offered to establish; nor was it ad-

missible as substantive proof, for it was hearsay.
The only way to meet evidence of a contradictory
statement is to prove the witness did not make it.
In the present case she admitted making it."
19. See Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 1126, and
cases cited.
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one of the earliest cases to make the distinction is that the admission of a
subsequent consistent statement "would enable the witness at any time to
control the effect of the former declarations, which he was conscious that he
had made, and which he might now have a motive to qualify or weaken or
destroy." 2° A Texas court in taking the opposite point of view answered the
above argument by saying "that the objection made applies to the weight
and not to the admissibility of the evidence.",,
It is certain that the legal problem considered in this note is a complicated one and therefore difficult to apply in the average trial. This fact should
result in vesting a discretion in a trial court. From this point of view it is
easy to agree with the Supreme Court of Missouri in refusing to reverse in
the principal case under consideration. But it should not necessarily follow
that there would have been a reversal if the trial court had made a different
ruling and thus admitted the supporting evidence.
2
0. D. Newlon
SALES-IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR FOOD. Smith
v. Carlos., The plaintiff contracted ptomaine poisoning from fish ordered and
eaten in defendant's restaurant. Plaintiff sued on the implied warranty of
fitness of the food and recovered. I[naffirming the judgment, the Springfield
Court of Appeals held that the transaction was in the nature of a sale and that
there was an implied warranty of fitness. The question had not previously
come before an appellate court in Missouri.
In this type of case recovery may be sought on either of two grounds:
(a) tort, for the negligence; (b) contract, for the breach of warranty implied
in law. The basis of tort is allowed by all courts, 2 for every manufacturer or
dealer in foodstuffs is under a common law duty to a purchaser to use reasonable care to make and keep the goods wholesome. 3 But the standard imposed
by different courts varies from that of a duty to use due care to that of an
insurer.4 When the duty is less than that of an insurer, there is difficulty in
proving negligence of the seller, 5 where he testifies as to his care in the selection,
preparation and service of the food.6 So, the doctrine of tort liability is varying and uncertain of application.
.

20. Ellicott v. Pearl (1836) 10 Peters 432. It
s to be noted that in this case the court disapproved of supporting statements in general
where there has been self contradictions.
21.
Taylor v. State (1920) 87 Tex. Cr. 330, 221
S. W. 611.
22. LL. B., U. of Mo. School of Law, 1923,
and now a member of the Rails County Bar.
1. (1923) 247S. W. 468.
2. Bishop v. Weber (1885) 139 Mass. 411, 1
N. E. 154; Greenwood Cafe v. Lovingood (1916)
197 Ala. 34, 72 So. 354; McPherson v. Capuano
& Co. (1924) 31 Ga. App. 82, 121 S. E. 580;
King v. Davis (1924) 296 Fed. 986.
3.
Ketterer v. Armour I Co. (1912) 200 Fed.
322; Flessher v. Carstens Packing Co. (1916)
(Wash.) 160 Pac. 14.
4.
Some courts extend the doctrine beyond
the duty to use due care, and make the dealer an

insurer. Parksv. Yost Pie Co. (1914) 92 Kan. 353,
144 Pac. 202. In King v. Davis, supra, n. 2,
negligence is said to be "due to the want of
reasonable care in ascertaining the truth."
5. Some require that it be expressly averred
and proved. Sheffer v. Willoughby (1896) 163 11.
518, 45 N. E. 253; Farrellv. Manhattan Market
Co. (1908) 198 Mass. 271, 84 N. E. 481, states
that there is no liability for negligence when the
dealer offers several articles from which the buyer
selects.
The better view here allows the application of
"res ipsa loquitur," McPhersonv. Capuano, supra,
n. 2.
Massachusetts and the Federal Courts
refuse to allow its application, King v. Davis,
supra, n. 2; Tonsman v. Greenglass (1924) (Mass.)
142 N. E. 756.
6. Crocker v. Baltimore Dairy Lunch (1913)
214 Mass. 177, 100 N. E. 1078; Pantaze v. [Pest
(1913) 7 Ala. App. 599, 61 So. 42.
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Coming to the facts as presented by the instant case, i. e., where a seller
prepares food to be served on the premises, there is found a marked difference
of opinion as to whether or not the transaction is a sale. At the outset it is
urged that the patron does not become the owner of the food, but purchases
only the privilege of eating all that he can out of what is served.7 Doubtless
this was true in the early days of the common law when the guest paid for his
lodging and board in a lump sum, but changing conditions of modern life
have altered this relation, until a steadily growing minority, including the
instant case, have held the transaction to be a sale., The restaurateur of
today serves not only his roomers, if he has them, but also those from outside who may care to come in. Also, a lump sum is not charged as formerly,
but a separate price is set upon each article. Thus, the court in the instant
case says: "We think the element of a sale of food enters into the transaction
where one goes into a restaurant, makes an order from a menu card upon
which are marked different prices for different dishes."' This seems to be a
sound recognition of changed conditions, and is a view which is supported by
respectable authority." ° In holding this to be a sale, some courts have relied
on cases where hotel and restaurant keepers have been criminally prosecuted
for selling partridge, quail and oleomargarine, under statutes forbidding their
sale."
An implied warranty as to the wholesomeness of food seems to rest upon
public policy, and the question resolves itself into the court's viewpoint on
this subject. In Jones v. Just, the doctrine of implied warranty was stated to
be: "Where a manufacturer or dealer contracts to supply an article which
he manufactures or produces, or in which he deals, to be applied to a particular purpose, so that the buyer necessarily trusts to the judgment or skill
of the manufacturer or dealer, there is in that case an implied term or warranty2
that it shall be reasonably fit for the purpose to which it is to be applied."
However, courts have differed as to whether or not a dealer in foodstuffs is
liable to his vendee on this warranty."3 Where he is a mere dealer the prevailing view imposes a warranty.14 Courts holding that there is a warranty,
base it on the fact that the article is for a particular use, known to the seller,
and that the buyer relied upon the skill of the vendor as to the selection of
the article, 5 though, as stated above, consideration of public policy appears to
be the real basis.
When the goods are purchased in the original package, the courts again

N. E. 853; Temple v. Keeler (1924) (N. Y.)
144 N. E. 635; Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co.

12. L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 197, 1. c. 202.
13. Blackstone said: "In contracts for provisions, it is always implied that they are wholesome."
This was founded, however, not on
warranty, but on ancient criminal statutes
making a dealer in unfit food criminally liable,
and its extension into a civil warranty is criticized.
See Burnby v. Bollet (1847) 16 M. & W. 644;
Y. B. 9 Hen. 6, 53.

(1918) 231 Mass. 65, 120 N. E. 407, 5 A. L. R.
1100. So, under Civil Code, Doyle v. Fuert 1
Kramer (1911) 129 La. 838, 56 So. 906.
9. (1923) (Mo. App.) 247 S. W. 468.

14. Barfield v. Heinemann (1918) 136 Ark.
456, 207 S. W. 62; Wiedeman v. Keller (1897)
171 Ill 93, 49 N. E. 210; Chapman v. Roggenkamp
(1913) 182 I1. App. 117; Ward v. Great Atlantic

10. Cases cited, supra, n. 2.
11.
People v. Clair (1917) 221 N. Y. 108, 116
N. E. 868; Commonwealth v. Miller (1890) 131 Pa.
118, 18 Atl. 938; Commonwealth v. Phoenix Hotel

& Pacific Tea Co. (1918) (Mass.) 120 N. E. 225;

7. Beale on Innkeepers, sec. 169; Parker v.
Flint, 12 Mod. 254; Merrill v. Hodron (1914)
88 Conn. 314, 91 At. 533; Rowe v. Louisville &

N. R. Co. (1922) (Ga. App.) 113 S. E. 823;
Loucks v. Morley (1919) (Calif. App.) 179 Pat.
529; Valeri v. Pullman Co. (1914) 218 Fed. 519.

8.

Race v. Krum (1918) 222 N. Y. 410, 118

Co. (1914) 162 S. W. 823, 157 Ky. 180.

Hoover v. Peters (1869) 18 Mich. 51.
15. Farrellv. Manhattan Market Co., supra, n.
5; Hoover v. Peters, supra, n. 14.
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divide, some holding a warranty to exist,"6 while others deny it on the ground
that there is no reliance upon the seller's skill in selection.- 7 But if the manufacturer of foodstuffs is sued on the warranty, the courts almost unanimously
allow recovery on the basis of public policy, even though the purchase by the
plaintiff was from a middleman."8 Many of the above cases arose under the
Sales Act," but as this is merely a codification of the common law as it existed
previously, this does not alter the fact of a warranty, if once the existence of
a sale is admitted. So, once having decided that the serving of food in a restaurant is a sale, the better view would seem to demand the existence of an implied warranty as to its fitness for the intended purpose. Further, in cases
such as the one under discussion, the restaurateur may also be considered a
manufacturer as well as a dealer, since he selects the ingredients, supervises
their blending and exercises his judgment in selecting the portion to be served.It has been suggested that instead of a sale of food there is a sale of the
privilege of consuming food, in connection with which a warranty should be
implied. 2 This seems objectionable only in that it assumes that the courts
would extend the doctrine of warranty to this class of licenses, though they
do not so extend it to other licenses.
Recently the New York Court of Appeals, on a set of facts identical with
the instant case, allowed recovery, saying: "We hold also that under such
circumstances, the buyer does by implication make known to the vendor the
particular purpose for which the article is required, and where the buyer may
assume that the vendor has had an opportunity to examine the articles sold,
it appears conclusively that he relies upon the latter's skill or judgment ...
Consequently there is an implied warranty that the food is reasonably fit for
consumption."", The court in the instant case ignores this point entirely,
merely saying that the warranty should attach and that the defendant should
be held liable as an insurer.
It is believed that, for the reasons above advanced, the result reached
in the case is sound, and that due to modern conditions of life, and the demands
of public policy, which is, after all, the reason for any implied warranty of
fitness for an intended purpose, the court is well justified in reaching the conclusion that it does.3
L. C. 0.
16. Chapman v. Roggenkamp, supra, n. 14;
Ward v. Tea Co., supra, n. 14; Jackson v. Watson
& Sons (1909) 2 K. B. 193, 1. c. 202.
17.
Tomlinson v. Armour & Co. (1908) 75
N. J. L. 748, 70 Ad. 314; Julian v. Laubenberger
(1896) 38 N. Y. S. 1052; Mazetti v. Armour & Co.
(1913) 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633.
18.
Parks v. Yost Pie Co., supra, n. 4 (sale
through middleman); Rainwater v. Hattitsborg
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (1923) (Miss.) 95 So. 444
(sale through middleman); Flesshtr v. Carstens
Packing Co. (1916) (Wash.) 160 Pac. 14; Walters
v. United Grocery Co. (1918) (Utah) 172 Pac. 47 3;
Catani v. Swift & Co. (1915) 251 Pa. 52, 95 Atl.
931.
19. Sales Act, sec. 15: "Where the buyer,
expressly or by implication makes known to the

seller the particular purpose for which the goods
are required, and it appears that the buyer relies
on the seller's skill or judgment, whether he be
the grower or manufacturer or not, there is an
implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose." This act has never
been adopted in thts state.
20. Walters v.
United Grocery Co., supra,
n. 18, 1.c. 474; Friend v.Childs Dining Hall Co.,
supra, n. 8, 1.c. 410, and cases cited; Race v.
Krum (1918) 222 N. Y. 410, 118 N. E. 853; see
also cases cited n. 18.

21.

27 Yale L. J. 1068.

22.

Temple v. Keeler (1924) (N. Y. ) 144 N. E.

635.
23.

23 Columbia Law Review,590.
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CRIMINAL LAW-INTOXICATION-SPECIFIC INTENT. State v.
Comer.' Defendant, convicted of assault with intent to commit rape, excepted
to an instruction which positively denied that drunkenness was any excuse or
extenuation and which in addition used these words;

"

. . .

neither can you

consider such intoxication in determining whether or not such assault was
made with intent to commit a rape, or whether or not it was made on purpose . . . ".

The Supreme Court of Missouri upheld the instruction, stating

that "the law is too well settled in this state to admit of discussion." This
seems to have been unnecessary for the decision inasmuch as the only testimony concerning intoxication was that while defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor, "he knew what he was doing." In other words
there was no evidence that he was intoxicated to the extent that would negative the existence of the specific intent.
Until the early part of the nineteenth century, it was settled by the common law that drunkenness was no defense to a crime. In fact there was some
disposition to treat it as an aggravation.2 Between 1800 and 1835 the doctrine
that drunkenness could be taken into consideration in behalf of the accused
began to creep into the law. Rex v. Grindley3 was the first decision "that
drunkenness put forward as a defense to a charge of crime was a circumstance
proper" to be taken into account. Park, J., in Rex v. Carrol,' stated that this
was not the law as the judge had later reversed himself. The English cases
are reviewed in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard,- which at least
seems to state that the English law sanctions the idea that drunkenness is to
be considered in determining whether a specific intent existed. Therefore the
Missouri doctrine was in line with the common law at that time.
At an early day Ryland, J., in reflecting whether the habit of gross intemperance might cause one without any apparent motive to commit perjury,
observed that drunkenness is no excuse for crime.5 In State v. Harlow,, Ryland,
J., held that drunkenness was not to be taken into consideration in determining the intent with which defendant did the act. He further held that on a
charge of murder the accused is not to be excused even though "he was so
much intoxicated as not to be able to act as a sane and rational man."
Likewise in State v. Cross,7 he delivered a strong opinion and part of his
language follows: "It is not perceived how drunkenness can be held to be a
circumstance proper to be considered by the jury in determining the question
of premeditation and malice, and at the same time be considered as no mitigation of the crime. It is said there is no inconsistency in the two doctrines
1. (1922) 247 S. W. 179.
2.
Reniger v. Fogossa (1550) 1 Plowd. 19;
Hale's Pleas of the Crown, vol. 1, page 32; Coke
upon Littleton, vol. 2, page 247a; see a discussion
of earlier authorities in People v. Rogers (1858) 18
New York 9.
3. (1819) 1 Russell on Crimes (9th ed.)
p. 12; Rex v. Grindley was the subject of comment
in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard (1920)
A. C. 479, 483, 495. It appears that Grindley was
charged with murder and that Holroyd, J., told
the jury that intoxication should be considered in
determining whether the act was premeditated or
done only in the stress, heat or impulse of the
moment.
See also Marshall's Case (1830) 1
Lewin C. C. 76.

4. (1835) 7 Car. & P. 145.
4a. See note 3, supra.
5. Schaller v. State (1851) 14 Mo. 502 (perjury).
6. (1855) 21 Mo. I. c. 458.
Defendant appealed from a conviction of manslaughter.
7.
(1858) 27 Mo. 332. Defendant appealed
from a conviction of murder in the first degree,
alleging that since the quality and grade of the
offense depended upon the state of mind of the
accused at the time of the commission of crime,
his drunkenness might be taken into consideration by the jury in determining whether he was in
a state of mind as would be unfavorable to the
commission of a crime requiring deliberation and
premeditation.
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because the fact of drunkenness ray show that the crime charged was not
committed. If the crime charged was not committed then it is immaterial
whether the defendant was drunk or sober; he is, in either event, entitled to
an acquittal. But if all the circumstances in the case, except drunkenness,
show that the crime charged was committed, and drunkenness alone is the
circumstance to show that by reason of its intervention among the circumstances of the case, the crime was different from what it would have been in
the absence of this circumstance, then it is manifest that this circumstance
alone has produced the mitigation, and the old principle of the common law,
which pronounces drunkenness to be no mitigation, is overturned.
In dissenting, Richardson, J., expressed the same point of view as did
Holroyd, J., in Rex v. Grindley, supra, viz: "But the inquiry is, whether, in
fact, the crime has been committed; and as the essence of the crime of murder
is made by law to depend upon the condition of the criminal's mind at the
time, all the circumstances ought to be heard in evidence to enable the jury
to decide whether such wilful, deliberate and premeditated design existed;
and drunkenness is a proper subject to be considered by the jury for whatever
it is worth in determining the state and condition of the mind."
In State v. Jordan,8 the rule in Missouri was baldly stated to be "that the
defense of voluntary drunkenness cannot be interposed to an offense committed as the immediate result of such drunkenness, and, although there may
be no criminal intent, the law will by construction, supply same."
The Missouri doctrine has been applied, usually without discussion,
until it has become a rule of thumb. The courts have been consistent inasmuch as not a case has been found to be out of line.10 As a corollary, it was
early established" that evidence of drunkenness is not admissible nor competent for the jury's consideration on the question of defendant's delibera.fion,
premeditation or wilfulness. This rigid rule has been followed in prosecutions
3
for other crimes requiring a specific intent, viz: attempt to rob,12 assault,1
attempted rape,1" and robbery."s
The common law has changed since 1835 in most jurisdictions on this
point. It is generally held that if'
at the time of the commission of such an
offense the accused was by intoxication so enjtirely deprived of his mental
faculties that he did not have the mental capacity to entertain the necessary
specific intent which is required to constitute the crime, he must necessarily
8. (1920) 285 Mo. 62, 225 S. W. 905 (assault
with intent to kill, a crime requiring a specific
intent).
See also State v. Duestrow (1896) 137 Mo. 44,
73, 88, 38 S. W. 554; State v. Woodward (1905) 191
Mo. 617, 90 S. W. 90; State v. Church (1906)
199 Mo. 605, 98 S. W. 16; State v. Bobbst (1916)
269 Mo. 214, 190 S. W. 257; State v. Riley (1, 90)
100 Mo. 493, 13 S. W. 1063 (evidence insufficient
to show defendant either drunk or insane at
time in question); State v. Murphy (1893) 118
Mo. 7, 25 S. W. 95.
9. State v. Bushong (1922) 246 S. W. 919
(accord).
10. State v. Hays (1856) 23 Mo. 1. c. 323, has
been cited as inconsistent but the instruction
was given by the trial court at defendant',i request. See State v. Hundley (1870) 46 Mo. 414
(temporary insanity as immediate result o" in-

toxication).
11.
State v. O'Reilly (1895) 126 Mo. 597, 29
S. W. 577; State v. Edwards (1879) 71 Mo. 312
(Henry, J., dissented.); State v. Ramsey (1884)
82 Mo. 133; State v. Sneed (1885) 88 Mo. 138
(Henry, J., dissented.); State v. West (1900)
157 Mo. 1. c. 318, 57 S. W. 1071 (attempt to rob);
Statev. Brown (1904) 181 Mo. 192, 79 S. W. 1111;
Statev. Dearing (1887) 65 Mo. 530.
12. State v. West (1900) 157 Mo. 309, 57 S. W.
1071.
13. State s. Pitts (1874) 58 Mo. 556; State s.
Jordan (1920) 285 Mo. 62, 225 S. W. 905; State
v. Lloyd (1919) 217 S. W. 26 (assault with intent
to kill).
14. State v. .lcorn (1896) 137 Mo. 121, 38
S. W. 548.
15. State v. Stebbins (1905) 188 Mo. 387, 87
S. W. 460.
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be acquitted;6 and in like manner the fact of defendant's drunkenness should
be considered in certain instances in determining the degree of the crime.
This is so, not because drunkenness excuses crime but if the mental status
required by law to constitute crime be one of specific intent or of a definite
mental status, and drunkenness excludes the existence of either, then the particular crime charged has not in fact been committed. This conclusion seems
logical.
But law is not merely a matter of logic; experience is the final test. There
is danger that undue weight will be attached to the fact of drunkenness or
that it will be used as a cloak or excuse for crime. This has led to some confusion among the courts which have adopted the rule that drunkenness may
be shown to negative the existence of a specific intent. Many courts allow
drunkenness to negative facts which will reduce the homicide from first to
second degree murder." A few will permit the same process to reduce it to
the specific 21intention2
manslaughter18 Drunkenness may be shown to negative
°
9
without which there may be no robbery," larceny," attempt to rape, assault
with intent to kill, burglary,23 or attempt to commit suicide.,4 This leads to
an anomaly. If one is charged with an assault to commit rape (requiring specific intent) he would be entitled to an acquittal in most jurisdictions if the
jury could be persuaded that he was so completely intoxicated as to be incapable of forming any purpose to seek sexual connection with the female.
If, however, the same individual had under the same circumstances succeeded
in having sexual connection, the jury would have no right to return an acquittal. Such a distinction seems perfectly logical but an unfortunate one, nevertheless.
On the other hand, the hard and fast Missouri rule would lead to questionable results. It so happens that in Missouri (so far as the writer has discovered) there has never been a "hard" case; that is, a case where the facts
strongly showed that a defendant charged with a crime requiring a specific
intent was intoxicated to the extent that he could not have had the particular
state of mind required. In a New Zealand case a prisoner was charged with
(1) stealing tobacco and cigarettes in a store, and (2) breaking into the store
with intent to steal. The trial court in charging the jury, instructed, (among
other things) as follows: "If the prisoner blundered into the store through a
drunken mistake, and under such circumstances as to indicate inability to
form any definite purpose, and especially to form the purpose of committing
16. See Bishop on Criminal Law (9th ed.)
secs. 408-413; 36 L. R. A. 465 (note); 11 Hare.
L. R. 341; 34 Harv. L. R. 78; 12 A. L. R. 861
(note).
17. People v. Lronardi (1894) 143 N. Y. 360,
38 N. E. 372 (under New York penal code);
People v. Methever (1901) 132 Cal. 326, 64 Pac.
481 (under California code; dictum); State v.
Roan (1904) 122 Iowa 136, 97 N. W. 997 (dictum);
Com. e. Cleary (1892) 148 Pa. 26, 23 At. 1110;
Gustavenjon v. State (1902) 10 Wyo. 300, 60 Pac.
1006; Hopi v. People (1881) 104 U. S. 631, 26
L. Ed. 873 (under Utah code.).
18.
Rex v. Meade (1909) 1 K. B. 895; Tubby v.
State (1919) 15 Okla. Crim. Reps. 496, 178 Pac.
491 (apparently murder was not divided into

degrees). State v. Corrivau (1904) 93 Minn. 38,
IOU N. W. 638 (statute involved;
dictum);
Hill v. State (1913) 9 Ala. App. 7, 64 So. 163.
19.
Terhune v. Commonwealth (1911) 144 Ky.
213, 175 S.W. 355.
20. Ryan v. U. S. (1905) 26 App. D. C. 74(dictum).
21. Reagan v. State (1889) 28 Tex. Crim.
App. 227, 12 S. W. 601.
22. State v. Pasnau (1902) 118 Iowa 501, 92
N. W. 682; Booher v. State (1901) 156 1nd. 435, 60
N. E. 156,54 L. R. A. 391.
23. Bruen v. People (1903) 206 111. 417, 69
N. E. 24; People v. Eggleiton (1915) 186 Mich.
510, 152 N. W. 944.
24. Reg. v. Moore (1852) 16 Jur. 750.
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a larceny, then he ought to be accluitted."2 Under the same circumstances
would the Missouri Supreme Court say that the instruction was wrong?
Would the Supreme Court of Missouri affirm a conviction of a fe.ony because
a drunken man "blundered" into a store building? If so, burglary may be
nothing more than drunkenness plus a trespass.
R. C. F.
25.
R. v. Matheison (1906) 25 N. Z. L. R. 879.
The information set forth in this note was obtained from I Russell on Crimes, 8th ed., p. 91.
See note on page 92, where it is stated: "The
jury found that the prisoner had blundered into
the store under a drunken mistake, and without

intention to commit any offence, but that while
in the store he appropriated the cigarettes, and
knew then and there that he was taking the
cigarettes of another person. On this finding, a
verdict of guilty of larceny was directed."

